Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn: Tenth
Circuit Employment Law Remains in “Me Too” Limbo
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sprint/United Management Co. v.
Mendelsohn1 left Tenth Circuit litigants in disparate treatment employment
discrimination suits seeking clarification on the admissibility requirements for
“me too” evidence—evidence of similar complaints of discrimination by a
plaintiff’s co-workers offered “as proof of an employer’s discriminatory
motives and intent.”2 The Mendelsohn Court held that “me too” evidence can
be admitted to prove age discrimination so long as it satisfies the requirements
of Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) Rules 401 and 403: it must be relevant,
and its potentially prejudicial effect must not substantially outweigh its
probative value.3 Ultimately, the Court determined, “me too” evidence is
neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible.4
The Court’s plain-language interpretation and application of the FRE
answered the issue presented on appeal, but some lingering questions
concerning the relevance of “me too” evidence remain. For example,
confusion still exists regarding whether the “same supervisor” rule extends to
cases involving a company-wide reduction in force (RIF) and thus which
definition of “similarly situated” trial courts should apply.5 As a result, though
the the Supreme Court likely intended its ruling in Mendelsohn to streamline
the admissibility of “me too” evidence at the trial level, the ruling appears to
be having precisely the opposite effect.6 Because trial courts may no longer
consider such evidence as per se relevant or irrelevant, many cases will now
require the court to engage in a lengthy Rule 403 analysis, whereas no such
analysis was required when the relevance issue was predetermined.
1. 552 U.S. 379 (2008).
2. J. Ray Poole, Limiting the Use of “Me Too” Evidence in Employment Discrimination
Cases, FLA. B.J., June 2001, at 81, 81.
3. See Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 386-88.
4. Id. at 388.
5. Courts applying the “same supervisor” rule exclude “me too” evidence if the witness
and the plaintiff had different supervisors, worked in different areas of the company, or were
terminated at different times. See, e.g., Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302
(5th Cir. 2000). Courts imposing “similarly situated” requirements consider surrounding
circumstances when determining whether there is a sufficient nexus between the situation of the
witness and the plaintiff that makes the “me too” evidence relevant and therefore admissible.
See, e.g., Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 382 (discussing the Mendelsohn trial court’s stated
reasoning).
6. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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Primarily examining the issues in the context of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act7 (ADEA), this note discusses how the federal courts have
historically analyzed the relevance of “me too” evidence in the past and
identifies how that analysis is changing in light of the Mendelsohn decision.8
Part II introduces the ADEA and describes the role of “me too” evidence
within the framework of an ADEA action. Part III presents an overview of
how various circuits across the country addressed the relevance of “me too”
evidence before Mendelsohn, with an emphasis on Tenth Circuit precedent.
Part IV discusses the Tenth Circuit’s decision in the case at length to provide
sufficient background information before addressing the Supreme Court’s
Mendelsohn ruling and explaining how the Court reached its conclusion
regarding the relevance of “me too” evidence. Part V recounts initial reactions
and responses as scholars and courts alike attempt to reconcile well-settled
precedent with Mendelsohn and apply its principles to future litigation. Part
V also analyzes the significance of the Court’s evidentiary ruling in the context
of employment law and identifies the various roles Mendelsohn will play in
subsequent “me too” admissibility rulings. Part VI concludes this note.
II. “Me Too” Evidence in ADEA Litigation
In response to an aging American work force, Congress enacted the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act in 1967 “to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways
of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”9 The
ADEA prohibits an employer from terminating an employee purely on the
basis of age,10 enabling a discharged employee forty years of age or older to
file a claim against his employer for “disparate treatment,”11 which occurs

7. U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(1967)).
8. Some of the cases cited in this note are non-ADEA cases that involve allegations of
discrimination arising under Title VII and other statutory anti-discrimination regimes. “Since
disparate treatment cases under the ADEA are proven in the same fashion as Title VII cases,
the same types of proof of intentional discrimination which apply to Title VII cases also apply
to ADEA cases.” 8 EMPL. COORDINATOR Employment Practices § 107:59 (2010) (citations
omitted).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
10. Id. § 623(a)(1).
11. See id. § 631(a); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993)
(finding the “disparate treatment” theory of employment discrimination available under the
plain language of the ADEA).
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when an employer treats some employees less favorably than others based on
their age.12
A presumption of discriminatory intent does not arise when an employer
terminates an older employee and replaces her with a younger employee,
absent other evidence establishing a pattern of age discrimination, because
older individuals invariably leave the work force in larger numbers at any
given time than younger individuals.13 To prevail under the ADEA on a
discriminatory termination claim, a plaintiff must prove that age was a
“determining factor” in the challenged employment decision.14 Age need not
have been the only factor influencing the employer’s decision, but the plaintiff
must establish that it played an influential role.15
In a typical ADEA case, a plaintiff may satisfy her burden of proof in one
of two ways. She may either present direct or circumstantial evidence that age
played a determinative role in her termination or set forth a prima facie case
of age discrimination in accordance with the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green framework.16 In addition to these standard alternatives, the Supreme
Court has determined that a plaintiff may also establish a prima facie case
under the ADEA by presenting statistical evidence that demonstrates a pattern
or policy of discriminatory conduct by the employer.17 In contrast to a
disparate treatment claim, which focuses on the individual employee filing suit
and a specific instance of alleged discrimination, cases involving
discriminatory pattern or practice claims tend to be much broader in scope and
involve allegations that all employees in a protected group were treated
unfavorably.18 Many courts refuse to admit pattern or practice evidence in
disparate treatment cases to prevent trials within trials from arising that distract

12. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609.
13. See 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 2465 (2002) (recognizing that “[s]ince the
progression of age is a universal human process, employees leaving the workforce will more
often than not be replaced by younger employees”).
14. Lucas v. Dover Corp., Norris Div., 857 F.2d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting
EEOC v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503, 507 (10th Cir. 1988)).
15. Sperry, 852 F.2d at 507 (citing EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 763 F.2d
1166, 1170 (10th Cir. 1985)).
16. Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 557-58 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (specifying the elements required to establish a prima facie
case of race discrimination under Title VII)). Courts regularly apply a customized model of the
McDonnell Douglas framework to individual disparate treatment claims under the ADEA.
Sperry, 852 F.2d at 507.
17. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (finding
statistical proof admissible to establish race discrimination, but noting that “[s]tatistics are
equally competent in proving employment discrimination”).
18. See 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 2434 (2002).
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the jury and shift its focus away from the specific circumstances surrounding
the plaintiff’s claim.19
Under the disparate treatment version of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, a plaintiff alleging age discrimination must prove the following
elements: (1) she was a member of the protected age group; (2) she was
performing satisfactory work; (3) she was terminated despite her adequate
performance; and (4) she was replaced by a younger employee.20 Given the
special circumstances of a RIF case, courts have modified the fourth element
and only require plaintiffs to “produc[e] evidence, circumstantial or direct,
from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended
to discriminate in reaching the decision at issue.”21 Circumstantial evidence
indicating that the plaintiff received less favorable treatment than younger
employees during the RIF can satisfy this tailored element.22
Plaintiffs typically rely heavily on circumstantial evidence to prove age
discrimination “[b]ecause direct testimony as to the employer’s mental
processes seldom exists.”23 Where relevant and sufficiently probative, some
courts admit evidence regarding similar complaints of discrimination by the
plaintiff’s former co-workers.24 A plaintiff generally offers such “me too”
evidence to establish the employer’s discriminatory intent and motives,25 but
employers have also been known to offer comparative evidence if it positively
relates to their motives in employment discrimination cases.26 Employers
frequently challenge “me too” evidence offered by a plaintiff as unfairly
prejudicial and therefore inadmissible under FRE Rule 403, because such
evidence is often inflammatory and threatens to create minitrials within a trial
on issues tangential to the plaintiff’s claims.27 In short, employers argue, “me
too” evidence improperly influences the jury’s decision.
19. See, e.g., Schrand v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988); Moorhouse
v. Boeing Co., 501 F. Supp. 390, 393 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d, 639 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980).
20. Sperry, 852 F.2d at 507 (citing Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 177
(10th Cir. 1986)).
21. Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 771 (10th Cir. 1988) (alteration in
original) (quoting Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981)).
22. Id.; see also Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1165-68 (10th Cir. 1998)
(identifying three ways a plaintiff can demonstrate that a RIF was purely pretextual).
23. Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 552 U.S. 379 (2008); see also Poole, supra note 2, at 81.
24. See Poole, supra note 2, at 81-82.
25. See id.
26. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn: The
Supreme Court Appears To Have Punted on the Admissibility of “Me Too” Evidence of
Discrimination. But Did It?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 264, 274-75 (2008), http://www.
law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/prior-colloquies/mendelsohn.html.
27. See Poole, supra note 2, at 82.
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When a plaintiff seeks to introduce “me too” evidence, the
FRE—specifically Rules 401, 402, and 403—function as evidentiary
safeguards to ensure that the proffered testimony will not unduly disadvantage
the employer. Just as all evidence must be shown somehow relevant to the
determinative issues in the case before it can be admitted, “me too” evidence
must first prove relevant to the employer’s alleged discriminatory intent under
Rule 401 to be admissible.28 Whether “me too” evidence ultimately makes it
more or less probable that the employer acted with discriminatory animus—in
other words, whether such evidence overcomes the low threshold for relevance
under Rule 401—largely depends on the additional rules imposed by the
specific jurisdiction.29 Nonetheless, relevant “me too” evidence can be
excluded under Rule 403 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice” or another of the contemplated evidentiary
dangers.30 However, courts generally recognize Rule 403 as an “extraordinary
remedy to be used sparingly” to exclude otherwise admissible evidence.31
Determining relevance and probative value demands relational, factsensitive inquiries best conducted by trial courts.32 Given the nature of these
28. Evidence qualifies as relevant under Rule 401 when it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401; see also 8 EMPL.
COORDINATOR Employment Practices § 106:2 (2010) (“[A]s is the case in almost all federal
civil proceedings, admissibility [of] and weight [assigned to evidence] in job discrimination
cases are governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) and the discretion of the court.”
(footnotes omitted)).
29. See, e.g., Schrand v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding
“me too” testimony irrelevant to the plaintiff’s claim of age discrimination because the
witnesses did not work in geographical proximity to the plaintiff and were not terminated by
the plaintiff’s supervisor); Goff v. Cont’l Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1982)
(requiring that “me too” witnesses demonstrate knowledge of plaintiff’s circumstances or
employer’s underlying motive, intent, or purpose in the challenged employment decision for
their testimony to be admissible), overruled on other grounds by Carter v. S. Cent. Bell, 912
F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302 (5th
Cir. 2000) (applying a “similarly situated” test, which operates to exclude “me too” evidence
if the witness and the plaintiff had different supervisors, worked in different areas of the
company, or were terminated at different times).
30. FED . R. E VID . 403. In addition to exclusion on the basis of unfair prejudice, Rule 403
excludes relevant evidence where “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of . . . confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id.
31. Wheeler v. John Deer Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Romine v.
Parman, 831 F.2d 944, 945 (10th Cir. 1987)) (affirming the admission of testimony of other
individuals injured in similar accidents despite its potentially prejudicial effect because firsthand accounts represent the preferred method of introducing evidence).
32. See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387 (2008).
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inquiries, “[b]lanket pretrial evidentiary exclusions”33—per se bans—are
unfair and impracticable in employment discrimination cases.34 In appellate
litigation, courts adhere to the principle that a trial court’s evidentiary rulings
typically merit deference.35 A district court’s decision should only be
overturned for abuse of discretion—that is, “when [the court] commits an error
of law or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.”36
This abuse of discretion standard lies at the heart of the “me too” dispute
presented to the Supreme Court for review in Mendelsohn. On writ of
certiorari, the Court reviewed the Tenth Circuit’s finding that the district court
had applied a per se evidentiary rule against “me too” evidence and thereby
abused its discretion.37 The Mendelsohn Court determined that the district
court had not actually applied such a per se rule in the first instance and
vacated the Tenth Circuit’s ruling accordingly.38 Notwithstanding this
apparent rebuke of the Tenth Circuit, the Court’s highly anticipated
Mendelsohn decision dispelled the notion, embraced in several other circuits,39
that “me too” evidence is necessarily irrelevant and therefore always
inadmissible to establish an employer’s discriminatory conduct or intent in an
individual ADEA case.40
Unfortunately, the Court left many essential issues regarding “me too”
evidence admissibility unresolved, especially within the Tenth Circuit, which
has a history of treating this form of circumstantial evidence more favorably
than its fellow circuits.41 These enduring questions raise concerns within the
legal community that the number of ADEA suits and the cost of litigation will
increase dramatically. Some fear that overly cautious judges will entertain
evidentiary disputes more frequently and prolong admissibility assessments of
“me too” evidence in response to the Supreme Court’s admonition against per
se exclusions.42 What is certain is that each individual circuit must now align
33. Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006).
34. See Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 1988), abrogated on
other grounds by Foster v. Univ. of Ark., 938 F.2d 111, 115 (8th Cir. 1991).
35. See, e.g., Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1230.
36. Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius, 443 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2006).
37. See Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 384-85.
38. See id. at 385-88.
39. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (No. 06-1221), 2007
WL 738928, at *5 (contending that “four circuits have held ‘me, too’ evidence wholly
irrelevant”).
40. See Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 387-88.
41. For illustrative opinions, see cases cited infra note 45.
42. See David L. Gregory, Sprint/United Management Company v. Mendelsohn and CaseBy-Case Adjudication of “Me Too” Evidence of Discrimination, 102 NW. U. L. COLLOQUY 382,
384-86 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/prior-colloquies/mendel
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its decisions with the Court’s holding in Mendelsohn by not excluding “me
too” evidence automatically.
III. The Relevance of “Me Too” Evidence Before Sprint/United
Management Co. v. Mendelsohn
One scholar describes the pre-Mendelsohn law governing “me too”
evidence as being in a “state of disarray.”43 Before the Supreme Court’s
Mendelsohn decision, many circuit courts routinely restricted or denied
admissibility of “me too” evidence on the grounds that this type of evidence
lacked relevance altogether.44 The Tenth Circuit differed from these other
circuits, frequently finding “me too” evidence relevant to the issue of an
employer’s discriminatory intent.45
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in
Mendelsohn fell squarely within this line of precedent.46
A. The Relevance of “Me Too” Evidence in the Tenth Circuit
Applying the general admissibility framework outlined in Part II of this
paper, the Tenth Circuit frequently found “me too” evidence relevant—and
oftentimes admissible under Rule 403—in discrimination cases before
Mendelsohn.47 To support a relevance finding where discriminatory intent was
sohn.html; Michael J. Newman & Shane Crase, The Supreme Court Rejects Per Se Admissibility
of “Me Too” Evidence, FED. LAW., June 2008, at 16, 17; Rubinstein, supra note 26, at 275.
43. Rubinstein, supra note 26, at 267.
44. See, e.g., Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 2000);
Schrand v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762
F.2d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 1985).
45. See Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding the
district court’s decision to admit “me too” testimony of two former employees with a different
manager than plaintiff as evidence relevant to employer’s discriminatory intent); see also
Gossett v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (10th Cir.
2001) (finding pattern or practice evidence relevant to employer’s discriminatory animus);
Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 561 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding evidence that
employer terminated other older employees relevant to establish a pattern of dismissal based
on age discrimination); Bingman v. Natkin & Co., 937 F.2d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding
that testimony regarding other employees’ subsequent RIF terminations was sufficiently close
in time to plaintiff’s termination to render the testimony relevant to employer’s policies and
practices).
46. See Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 552 U.S. 379 (2008).
47. See Spulak, 894 F.2d at 1156; see also Gossett, 245 F.3d at 1177-80; Bingman, 937
F.2d at 557. But see Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 777 (10th Cir. 1999)
(upholding the exclusion of “me too” testimony regarding events that occurred after plaintiff
was terminated due to the diminished relevance of such testimony); Curtis v. Okla. City Pub.
Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding no abuse of discretion
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at issue, the Tenth Circuit required that the testimony of the “me too” witness
either establish a pattern of discriminatory behavior by the employer or
“discredit the employer’s assertion of legitimate motives.”48 The Tenth Circuit
adopted the Sixth Circuit’s “me too” admissibility approach in the context of
retaliatory termination, requiring the plaintiff to establish a logical or
reasonable connection between the testifying employee’s circumstances and
the employer’s motivation in terminating the plaintiff.49 In the disparate
treatment claim context, however, the court admitted pattern or practice
evidence of discrimination “as circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s
discriminatory animus,” regardless of whether the plaintiff raised a pattern or
practice allegation.50
Spulak v. K Mart Corp., which followed these guiding principles, provides
a helpful illustration of the Tenth Circuit’s standard admissibility analysis of
“me too” evidence.51 The plaintiff in Spulak worked as a department manager
in the auto service department at K Mart.52 Following a corporate
restructuring, Spulak felt that his position was being jeopardized by the actions
of both his new manager and a mechanic under Spulak’s supervision.53
Spulak, who was fifty-eight at the time,54 inquired about the effect early
retirement would have on his benefits package.55 Following this inquiry,
Spulak’s manager ordered an investigation of Spulak, which resulted in
accusations that Spulak violated company policy on several different
occasions.56 Spulak’s manager presented him with the ultimatum that he either
retire early or be fired, at which point Spulak decided to retire to avoid losing
his benefits.57 He was then replaced by a younger employee.58 Spulak sued
K Mart under the ADEA, alleging constructive discharge on the basis of age.59
where district court excluded “me too” testimony for lack of relevance and insufficient
probative value under Rule 403).
48. Coletti, 165 F.3d at 776 (citing Spulak, 894 F.2d at 1156) (discussing the Tenth
Circuit’s standard of proof for plaintiffs alleging discriminatory intent in employee discharge
cases).
49. Id. at 777 (citing Curtis, 147 F.3d at 1217; Schrand v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d
152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988)).
50. Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1227 n.2 (citing Greene, 98 F.3d at 561; Bingman, 937 F.2d
at 556-57; Gossett, 245 F.3d at 1177-78).
51. See 894 F.2d 1150.
52. Id. at 1152.
53. Id. at 1152-53.
54. Id. at 1154.
55. Id. at 1153.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1154.
59. Id. at 1152.
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Although Spulak did not involve a RIF, the facts are analogous to the facts
presented in Mendelsohn because Spulak alleged that K Mart did not enforce
company rules uniformly, which suggested that the rules were nothing more
than “a pretext to mask age discrimination.”60
At trial, Spulak presented testimony from two former K Mart employees
that were in the same protected age group—both employees worked at a
different store location, but one held the same position as Spulak.61 The “me
too” witnesses claimed that they received similar discriminatory treatment
before being terminated and replaced by younger workers.62 The district court
admitted the testimony as “logically or reasonably” tied to Spulak’s
termination based on findings of geographical and temporal proximity—the
“me too” witnesses worked in the same state and were fired shortly after
Spulak left his job.63 Additionally, a K Mart manager mentioned Spulak’s
“early retirement” to one of the witnesses when encouraging him to “retire” as
well, further supporting the probative value of the similar circumstances.64 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the admissibility of this “me too” testimony
and recognized that testimony by former employees recounting treatment they
received from their employer is relevant, “[a]s a general rule, . . . to the issue
of the employer’s discriminatory intent.”65
Applying the same relevance standard used in Spulak, the Tenth Circuit
found “me too” evidence admissible in Mendelsohn and reversed the district
court’s decision to exclude the proffered evidence.66 The panel took great
pains to distinguish the case at bar from an earlier case, Aramburu v. Boeing
Co.,67 which set forth the “same supervisor” rule in an employer-employee
60. Id. at 1155 (quoting Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th
Cir. 1988)). The district court in Mendelsohn precluded the plaintiff from using Sprint’s
statistical RIF spreadsheets to support a theory that Sprint favored younger employees, but
admitted the evidence as support for the theory that Sprint neglected to follow proper RIF
procedure and that Sprint’s purported adherence to procedure was therefore a pretext for
discrimination. Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 552 U.S. 379 (2008).
61. Spulak, 894 F.2d at 1156.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 1156 n.2 (distinguishing the facts of the case before it from Second and Sixth
Circuit precedent).
64. Id. at 1156.
65. Id. The Tenth Circuit cited cases from the Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits
as demonstrating the existence of this “general rule.” See id.
66. Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing
Spulak, 894 F.2d at 1156 n.2) (“The testimony of the other employees concerning Sprint’s
alleged discriminatory treatment and similar RIF terminations is ‘logically or reasonably’ tied
to the decision to terminate Mendelsohn.”), vacated, 552 U.S. 379 (2008).
67. 112 F.3d 1398 (10th Cir. 1997).
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discriminatory discipline context.68
In Aramburu, the Tenth Circuit
conditioned the admissibility of “me too” evidence on a showing that the “me
too” witness was “similarly situated” to the plaintiff—meaning that he or she
dealt with the same supervisor and was subject to the same performance
evaluation and discipline standards.69 Emphasizing that it was addressing an
instance of alleged discriminatory RIF, the Mendelsohn panel narrowly
confined the scope of Aramburu by drawing a distinction between
discriminatory employee discipline and discriminatory RIFs on the basis that
the former is individual in nature, whereas the scope of the latter tends to be
company-wide.70
The Mendelsohn court noted that the Tenth Circuit has consistently applied
the Aramburu “same supervisor” rule only in cases involving alleged
discriminatory discipline.71 For instance, the Tenth Circuit explicitly refused
to extend the application of the “same supervisor” rule in Gossett v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Board of Regents for Langston University,72 a gender discrimination
action involving allegations of program-wide discrimination at a nursing
school.73 Gossett, a male student, alleged that the school discriminated against
male students in its application of a policy allowing instructors to provide
failing students with additional time to improve their grades.74 The Gossett
court concluded that the lower court erred in refusing to admit the affidavit of
a female nursing student, who received a higher grade under the school-wide
policy, simply because she was “enrolled in a different course taught by a
different instructor.”75 Relying on Gossett, the Tenth Circuit in Mendelsohn
refused to apply the “same supervisor” rule to cases involving allegations of
a discriminatory company-wide RIF, recognizing that without “me too”
evidence, plaintiffs would find it difficult, if not impossible, to prove
discrimination where direct evidence was unavailable.76
Prior to Mendelsohn, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated a willingness to assess
“me too” evidence without allowing preconceived notions of the general
relevance of this type of evidence to impact its admissibility determinations.
68. See Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1227-28.
69. Aramburu, 112 F.3d at 1404.
70. Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1227-28.
71. Id. at 1227.
72. 245 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2001).
73. Id. at 1177-78 (citing, inter alia, EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d
1184, 1198 & n.10 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding the “same supervisor” rule legally inapplicable to
the issue of admissibility of “me too” evidence that was introduced to establish the existence
of a discriminatory company-wide policy in a pregnancy discrimination suit)).
74. Id. at 1177.
75. Id.
76. Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1228.
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In Mendelsohn, the Tenth Circuit adhered to this trend and refrained from
tacking any per se restrictions onto the relevance standard set forth in FRE
Rule 401. The Mendelsohn court’s refusal to apply the “same supervisor” rule
in a RIF context thus represents a natural outgrowth of the court’s history of
finding “me too” evidence relevant and illustrates its reluctance to establish
standards that unnecessarily preclude admissibility of such evidence.
B. The Relevance of “Me Too” Evidence in Other Circuits
Before the Supreme Court’s Mendelsohn ruling, the circuits were split over
the admissibility of “me too” evidence. In its petition for certiorari, Sprint
highlighted the conflict between the Tenth Circuit’s relevance analysis, as
applied in Mendelsohn, and the manner in which other circuits treated “me
too” evidence in disparate treatment cases.77 According to Sprint, at least four
circuits found “me too” evidence “wholly irrelevant” in age discrimination
cases.78 These circuits adhered to the general relevance framework discussed
in Part II, but imposed additional standards that substantially decreased the
likelihood that “me too” evidence would be found relevant, probative, and thus
ultimately admissible. From all appearances, the Eighth Circuit was the only
circuit that stood squarely with the Tenth Circuit in favoring the admissibility
of “me too” evidence.79
1. Circuits Disfavoring Admissibility
Rigid standards in many circuits led to the exclusion of most “me too”
evidence for lack of relevance. For instance, the Second Circuit required that
the evidence bear some “nexus to the challenged employment decision” to be
relevant.80 The Fifth Circuit demanded that a “me too” witness proffered in an
77. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 6-14.
78. Id. at 5-6; see also Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir.
2000); Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1130 (6th Cir. 1997); Schrand v. Fed.
Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988); Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 121
(2d Cir. 1984); Goff v. Cont’l Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled on other
grounds by Carter v. S. Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1990); Moorhouse v. Boeing Co., 501
F. Supp. 390, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d, 639 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980).
79. See Phillip v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 945 F.2d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that
“background evidence” of other age discrimination lawsuits filed against an employer “may be
critical for the jury’s assessment of whether a given employer was more likely than not to have
acted from an unlawful motive”), abrogated on other grounds by Foster v. Univ. of Ark., 938
F.2d 111, 115 (8th Cir. 1991)); Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Ctr., 900 F.2d 153, 154 (8th
Cir. 1990) (reversing the district court’s decision because “the evidentiary exclusions were
erroneous and deprived [the plaintiff] of a full opportunity to present her case to the jury”).
80. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 8 n.2 (interpreting the holding
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individual discrimination case demonstrate some knowledge of either the
plaintiff’s circumstances or the employer’s underlying motive, intent, or
purpose in the challenged employment decision.81 These circuit-specific
criteria essentially raised the threshold established by FRE Rule 401 by
introducing additional guidelines into the relevance analysis.82 Laying the
admissibility foundation for “me too” evidence in these circuits was no easy
burden for plaintiffs to bear.83
At first glance, many of the additional criteria established in these
jurisdictions appeared to accommodate the admissibility of “me too” evidence;
however, the rules often barred the introduction of “me too” evidence in
practice. For instance, Second Circuit authority allowed statistical pattern or
practice evidence to be introduced if it supported “an inference of age
discrimination.”84 Alternatively, if a plaintiff lacked direct evidence or
statistical proof, the Second Circuit admitted circumstantial evidence
suggesting that the employer preferred younger workers, provided the
evidence was logically related to age discrimination and supported an
inference that age played a determinative role in the plaintiff’s termination.85
Despite the flexible language of the Second Circuit’s pre-Mendelsohn
standards, Haskell v. Kaman Corp. illustrates the difficulties that arose in their
application.86 The plaintiff in Haskell sued his employer for terminating him
on the basis of age and introduced “me too” testimony at trial.87 The Second
Circuit reviewed the district court’s admission of several different pieces of
evidence and determined that six former Kaman officers should not have been
allowed to testify at trial regarding the circumstances surrounding their own
terminations or the terminations of other former officers.88 The Haskell court
deemed this evidence statistically insignificant and thus concluded that the
“me too” testimony provided “no basis for an inference of discrimination.”89
The court explained that for “me too” testimony involving statistical evidence
in Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 1985)).
81. See Goff, 678 F.2d at 596-97 (involving race discrimination).
82. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 401.
83. See, e.g., Wyvill, 212 F.3d at 302 (finding “me too” testimony inadmissible when the
witness and the plaintiff had different supervisors, worked in different departments, or were not
terminated in close temporal proximity); Goff, 678 F.2d at 596-97 (holding “me too” testimony
irrelevant when none of the other witnesses had worked in plaintiff’s department).
84. Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Stanojev v. Ebasco
Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir. 1981)).
85. Stanojev, 643 F.2d at 921.
86. See 743 F.2d 113.
87. See id. at 118.
88. Id. at 121.
89. Id. (quoting Pace v. S. Ry. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383, 1392 n.8 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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to be probative, “the sample must be large enough to permit an inference that
age was a determinative factor in the employer’s decision.”90 The court cited
several cases from other circuits involving insufficient sample sizes but did not
mention or define a situation involving a sufficiently large sample.91
The rules governing “me too” admissibility in the Sixth Circuit were equally
as stringent as the Second Circuit’s approach to “me too” relevance. For
instance, the plaintiff in Schrand v. Federal Pacific Electric Co. claimed age
discrimination and presented testimony at trial from two other former
employees who were allegedly informed that they were being fired on account
of their age.92 Applying a “same supervisor” rule, the Sixth Circuit found the
“me too” testimony inadmissible because the witnesses worked in a different
location and under different supervisors than the plaintiff.93 The Schrand court
viewed the testimony from the former employees as entirely irrelevant
because, despite the fact that the “me too” witnesses were explicitly told they
were terminated because of their age, their testimony failed to create a logical
relationship to the plaintiff’s termination.94 The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in
Schrand thus suggests that it did not admit pattern or practice evidence of
discrimination in disparate treatment cases in an effort to ensure the exclusion
of “me too” testimony.95
The major distinction between the circuits in the “me too” admissibility
context centered on the applicability of the “same supervisor” rule, which the
Tenth Circuit refused to apply in Mendelsohn,96 and its influence on the
“similarly situated” requirement. Following the Sixth Circuit’s lead, several
other circuits incorporated the “same supervisor” rule into their “me too”
admissibility framework. For example, to qualify as “similarly situated” in the
Fifth Circuit, a “me too” witness and the plaintiff must have shared the same
supervisors, worked in the same department within the company, and been
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988).
93. Id.
94. Id. (finding influential the fact that the plaintiff did not intend to establish a pattern or
practice of discrimination).
95. See id.; see also Williams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1130 (6th Cir. 1997)
(applying the Schrand rationale to pattern or practice evidence in the context of an allegation
of race discrimination). This essentially per se ban on pattern or practice evidence stands in
stark contrast to the Tenth Circuit’s approach toward such evidence in disparate treatment cases.
See Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1227 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 522 U.S. 379 (2008) (“[W]e have allowed evidence of a pattern and practice in
individual cases of discrimination as circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s discriminatory
animus.”).
96. See 466 F.3d at 1228; see also supra text accompanying note 76.
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terminated within close temporal proximity to each other.97 The Third and
Fourth Circuits adopted similar approaches.98 Not all circuits followed this
trend, however.
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Ally: The Eighth Circuit’s Approach Favoring
Admissibility
In contrast to the weight of authority across the circuits, Eighth Circuit
authority regarding the relevance of “me too” evidence generally ran parallel
to Tenth Circuit precedent. The Eighth Circuit commonly admitted “me too”
evidence based on the rationale that it provides “background evidence [that]
may be critical for the jury’s assessment of whether a given employer was
more likely than not to have acted from an unlawful motive.”99 In assessing
the admissibility of “me too” evidence, the Eighth Circuit explicitly eschewed
“crabbed notions of relevance [and] excessive mistrust of juries” and thus
distinguished itself from many of the other circuits.100 Yet the Eighth Circuit
did not merely take a position directly opposite that of the other circuits; it
recognized the danger of both blanket pretrial evidentiary exclusions and
blanket admissions of “me too” evidence at trial more than a decade before the
Supreme Court reached this same conclusion in Mendelsohn.101 Accordingly,
“me too” evidence was admissible in a disparate treatment case in the Eighth
Circuit, but only if it helped to establish a reasonable inference of
discrimination.102
The decision in Phillip v. ANR Freight Systems, Inc. exemplifies the Eighth
Circuit’s “me too” admissibility approach.103 Relying on Eighth Circuit
precedent, the Phillip court reversed the district court’s decision to exclude, on
grounds of insufficient similarity, the plaintiff’s proffered evidence that other
97. Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
anecdotal pattern or practice testimony of discrimination should have been excluded).
98. See Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 180, 190 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing,
inter alia, Schrand, 851 F.2d at 156) (choosing to focus on the plaintiff’s “personal experience,”
rather than experiences of the plaintiff’s co-workers); Moorhouse v. Boeing Co., 501 F. Supp.
390, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (upholding the exclusion of “me too” testimony from other employees
who had filed separate age discrimination suits on the basis that “to the extent testimony of each
witness was about his own lay off, it was not relevant to [the plaintiff’s] lay off”), aff’d, 639
F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980).
99. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other
grounds by Foster v. Univ. of Ark., 938 F.2d 111, 115 (8th Cir. 1991); see also supra note 79.
100. See Estes, 856 F.2d at 1103 (quoting Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697-98 (7th
Cir. 1987)).
101. See Callanan v. Runyun, 75 F.3d 1293, 1298 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Estes, 856 F.2d at
1103).
102. See Bradford v. Norfolk S. Corp., 54 F.3d 1412, 1419 (8th Cir. 1995).
103. See 945 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1991).
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age discrimination lawsuits had been filed against his employer.104 The Eighth
Circuit expressed concern that excluding the evidence deprived the plaintiff
of his right to present his case to the jury and also reemphasized its opinion
that “me too” evidence is usually relevant and therefore “should normally be
freely admitted at trial.”105 The divergence of this approach to “me too”
evidence from that of many of the other circuits created the divide that set the
stage for the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Mendelsohn.
IV. Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 2002, “as part of an ongoing company-wide RIF,” Sprint/United
Management Company (Sprint) terminated fifty-one-year-old Ellen
Mendelsohn (Mendelsohn) from the business development strategy group,
where she had worked since 1989.106 At the time, Mendelsohn was her unit’s
oldest manager.107 Mendelsohn subsequently filed an ADEA claim against
Sprint, alleging disparate treatment on the basis of age.108 At trial, Mendelsohn
attempted to introduce testimony from five other former Sprint employees over
the age of forty who claimed that they had experienced similar age
discrimination by Sprint supervisors and had ultimately been terminated as a
result of their age during the same RIF.109 Mendelsohn intended to use this
evidence to establish that a “pervasive atmosphere of age discrimination”
existed within the company.110
Three of the witnesses allegedly heard one or more Sprint supervisors make
derogatory comments about older workers.111 One witness claimed to have
“seen a spreadsheet suggesting that a supervisor considered age in making
layoff decisions.”112 Another witness asserted that he received an undeserved
negative evaluation, was “banned” from working at Sprint based on his age,
and witnessed age-related harassment of another employee.113 The last witness
claimed that Sprint required him to obtain permission before hiring an
104. Id. at 1056 (finding applicable the reasoning in Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Center,
900 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1990), and Estes, 856 F.2d 1097).
105. See id. (quoting Hawkins, 900 F.2d at 155-56).
106. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 381 (2008); Mendelsohn v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006), vacated, 552 U.S. 379.
107. Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1225.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1224-25.
110. Id. at 1225.
111. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 381.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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individual over age forty; he also claimed that a younger employee replaced
him following his termination and that Sprint “rejected his subsequent
employment applications.”114 The five witnesses had neither worked in the
same department as Mendelsohn nor worked under any of her supervisors or
ever reported hearing her supervisors make discriminatory remarks.115
Sprint filed a motion in limine to exclude “any evidence of Sprint’s alleged
discriminatory treatment of other employees,” specifically the testimony of the
five witnesses identified above, arguing that it was irrelevant to the central
issue of whether Sprint terminated Mendelsohn because of her age.116 Sprint
argued that the testimony would only be relevant if presented by employees
“similarly situated” to Mendelsohn—meaning employees who shared her
supervisors.117 Sprint further alleged that the dangers of unfair prejudice, issue
confusion, misleading the jury, and undue delay contemplated by Rule 403
substantially outweighed any possible probative value of the evidence.118
The district court granted the motion in a minute order and excluded
testimony of discrimination presented by employees not “similarly situated”
to Mendelsohn, a status which the court defined as requiring proof that (1)
Mendelsohn’s direct supervisor acted as “the decision-maker in any adverse
employment action” taken against the testifying employee and (2) Sprint
terminated the employee in close “temporal proximity” to Mendelsohn’s
termination.119 Consequently, Mendelsohn’s five “me too” witnesses could not
testify because they worked under different supervisors than did
Mendelsohn.120 Aside from the minute order, the district court provided no
written rationale for its ruling.121 The judge did, however, orally specify
during the course of trial that the minute order only excluded testimony “that
Sprint treated other people unfairly on the basis of age,” not testimony seeking
to prove that Sprint’s RIF was “a pretext for age discrimination.”122
Ultimately, the jury found in Sprint’s favor.123
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the district court erred in
excluding the “me too” evidence proffered by Mendelsohn.124 The court
114. Id.
115. Id. at 382.
116. Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 552 U.S. 379.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1230.
119. Id. at 1225 n.1.
120. Id. at 1225.
121. See Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 382-83.
122. Id.
123. Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1225.
124. Id. at 1224.
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interpreted the district court’s minute order as applying a “blanket pretrial
evidentiary exclusion”125 and found that the district court had abused its
discretion by mistakenly relying on the “same supervisor” rule set forth in
Aramburu v. Boeing Co. and thereby depriving Mendelsohn of a fair
opportunity to present her full case to the jury.126 The court distinguished
Aramburu, finding it inapplicable to the case at bar because it involved
“discriminatory discipline” as opposed to a company-wide policy of
discrimination.127 The Mendelsohn court concluded that the exclusion of
Mendelsohn’s circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus “unfairly
inhibited [her] from presenting her case to the jury.”128 The Tenth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial after finding that the evidence
was relevant and that its probative value outweighed any undue prejudice.129
Sprint then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court.130
B. Issue
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the FRE require
the admission of nonparty testimony detailing the discriminatory actions of
supervisors not involved in the adverse employment decision challenged by
the plaintiff.131 The Supreme Court considered the question in light of the fact
that the “me too” witnesses were not supervised by the same individuals
involved in Mendelsohn’s termination and did not work in the same
department within the company as did Mendelsohn.132 Although the Supreme
Court did not couch the issue in terms of the applicability of the Aramburu
“same supervisor” rule, its decision does suggest a limitation on the scope of
this rule, thus leaving open the possibility that the kind of “me too” evidence
proffered in Mendelsohn may be relevant and therefore admissible.

125. Id. at 1230. The Supreme Court later reproached the Tenth Circuit for too hastily
characterizing the district court’s ruling as indicative of a “per se rule that evidence from
employees with other supervisors is always irrelevant to proving discrimination in an ADEA
case.” Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 383; see also infra text accompanying note 133.
126. See Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1225-28.
127. Id. at 1227-28; see also supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
128. Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1226 (citing Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159,
1168 (10th Cir. 1998) (endorsing the introduction of an employer’s general policy of using a
RIF to “terminate older employees in favor of younger employees” as legitimate evidence of
pretext in RIF employment discrimination cases)).
129. See id. at 1230-31.
130. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39.
131. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 380-81 (2008).
132. See id. at 382.
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C. Holding
The Supreme Court determined that the Tenth Circuit should not have
assumed that the district court improperly applied a per se rule and likewise
should not have engaged in its own 403 balancing of the probative value of the
evidence against its possible prejudicial effect.133 The Court held that
“whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant [and
sufficiently probative] in an individual ADEA case” is a factual question that
“depends on many factors . . . . [and] requires a fact-intensive, context-specific
inquiry.”134 Based on this conclusion, the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth
Circuit’s ruling and remanded the case back to the district court for
clarification and the balancing that should have been explicitly performed on
the record in the initial proceedings.135 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held
that “me too” evidence is neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible.136
D. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court took exception to the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of
the district court’s ruling, specifically its determination that the district court
adopted Aramburu as controlling authority.137 Analyzing the district court
proceedings, the Court found no evidence to support the conclusion that the
district court relied on Aramburu.138 The Court noted that the district court did
not cite Aramburu in its decision or indicate reliance on the case in any other
way.139 The Supreme Court cautioned appellate courts against assuming that
lower courts relied on a case or adopted a legal position merely because a party
to the litigation cited the authority or supported the position in its brief or
argument.140
Applying a plain-language interpretation of the FRE, the Supreme Court
reached its conclusion that Rules 401 and 403 are “generally not amenable to
broad per se rules.”141 Finding that the district court’s decision was not
afforded due deference by the Tenth Circuit, the Mendelsohn Court ordered
that the case be remanded to the district court to “clarify the basis for [that
court’s] evidentiary ruling under the applicable rules.”142 The Court did not
133. See id. at 387-88.
134. Id. at 388.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 384-86.
138. Id. at 385.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 385 n.2 (citing Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 183 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
141. Id. at 387.
142. Id. at 388.
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reach the issue of whether the Aramburu “same supervisor” rule extends to
cases involving a discriminatory company-wide RIF.
V. Analysis
The Mendelsohn Court correctly concluded that Rules 401 and 403 do not
lend themselves to per se admissibility rules; however, the Supreme Court’s
decision runs contrary to part of the explicit purpose of Rule 403—to prevent
“undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.”143 Because the Court neglected to address the applicability of
Aramburu’s “same supervisor” rule, this ruling has the potential to generate
lengthier trials, increase the expense of litigation, and reduce the overall
efficiency of the legal system. The Mendelsohn Court reiterated the general
principle that trial courts maintain the authority, absent abuse of discretion, to
conduct evidentiary admissibility determinations.144 This principle is premised
on the notion that trial courts stand in the best position to assess the relevance
and probative value of evidence—including “me too” evidence—within the
specific context of any given case.145 Nevertheless, just as Rules 401 and 403
provide the courts with guidance, identifying employment discrimination
situations in which certain “me too” admissibility standards apply would assist
courts in following a similar analysis in each case to ensure fairness, avoid
unjustifiable expense and delay, ascertain the truth, and promote justice.146
A. Initial Reactions to Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn
Some scholars suggest that the Supreme Court will eventually be forced to
address the questions the Mendelsohn Court left unanswered, such as
Aramburu’s applicability, because additional disputes will inevitably arise
given the confusion still surrounding this controversial area.147 In his recent
analysis of the Mendelsohn decision, Professor Mitchell Rubinstein recognizes

143. FED. R. EVID. 403.
144. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 384.
145. See id.
146. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
147. See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 26, at 275; see also Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The
Significance of Sprint/United Management Company v. Mendelsohn: A Reply to Professors
Gregory and Secunda, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 387, 389 (2008) (“[T]he Court should
have supplied a set of criteria to be considered by lower courts when making determinations on
the admissibility of ‘me too’ evidence.”), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/
prior-colloquies/mendelsohn.html. But see Paul M. Secunda, The Many Mendelsohn “Me Too”
Missteps: An Alliterative Response to Professor Rubinstein, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
374, 381 (2008) (arguing that a clear set of rules is not desirable), http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/prior-colloquies/mendelsohn.html.
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that the circumstances under which “me too” evidence can be admitted when
witnesses had different supervisors remains an unresolved and controversial
question because the Supreme Court did not promulgate any clear legal
rules.148 Professor Rubinstein predicts that more “me too” testimony will be
admitted into evidence following Mendelsohn, which might result in lengthier
trials and additional litigation until these remaining issues are resolved.149
Given the recent notoriety of Mendelsohn, managing “me too” evidence will
undoubtedly become a more common part of trial preparation for all parties
involved.150
In response to Professor Rubinstein’s article, Professor Paul Secunda opines
that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mendelsohn under the mistaken
belief that its decision would have a much more pronounced impact on the
realm of “me too” evidence and employment law.151 In his paper, Professor
Secunda agrees that the Supreme Court reached the correct conclusion, but
asserts that certiorari should never have been granted for such a contextualized
evidentiary ruling.152 Recognizing the importance of context in evidentiary
issues, Professor Secunda concludes that it is “highly unlikely” the Supreme
Court will create a bright-line rule to govern “me too” evidence.153
B. Defining the Scope of Per Se Rules in the “Me Too” Context
Although it might appear that the holding in Mendelsohn—that “me too”
evidence is neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible—only addresses
a relatively minor point of law, courts across the country needed clarification
and guidance to reconcile the “me too” admissibility split between the circuits.
While bright-line, per se rules are inappropriate in evidentiary determinations
governed by Rules 401 and 403, standards and guidelines for applying the
FRE are necessary. In the “me too” evidentiary context, it remains unclear
which standards and guidelines are included in the Mendelsohn Court’s notion
of per se rules—rules that automatically determine the admissibility of “me
too” evidence without regard for the surrounding facts and context of the
case.154 For instance, courts commonly imposed geographical, temporal, and
148. See Rubinstein, supra note 26, at 272-73.
149. Id. at 275. Admitting “me too” evidence more frequently poses the threat of inundating
courts with testimony from an unmanageable number of witnesses, which will reduce judicial
efficiency unless the lower courts can develop a highly efficient method for determining
admissibility. See Gregory, supra note 42, at 384.
150. See Gregory, supra note 42, at 385-86.
151. See Secunda, supra note 147, at 377-78.
152. See id. at 380.
153. Id. at 376.
154. See BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “per se” as “[o]f, in, or
by itself; standing alone, without reference to additional facts”).
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contextual proximity requirements on “me too” evidence in employment
discrimination cases before Mendelsohn.155 These limitations and guidelines
have proven beneficial because they limit the amount of “me too” evidence the
courts must substantively consider, thereby increasing the efficiency of
litigation. Without guidelines of some sort, “me too” evidence would
overshadow the trial and the facts of the case at hand. Mendelsohn does not
appear to have identified these kinds of considerations as per se rules of
admissibility or inadmissibility.156 By contrast, while the “same supervisor”
rule represents a similar guideline that courts follow, its applicability remains
in question.157
The Mendelsohn Court concluded that the district court did not apply a per
se rule excluding “me too” evidence because “the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s discussion
of the evidence neither cited Aramburu nor gave any other indication that its
decision relied on that case.”158 This language—coupled with the Court’s
observation that the application of a per se rule would have justified the Tenth
Circuit’s abuse of discretion reversal159—suggests that the Supreme Court
would define the “same supervisor” rule as a per se rule. The Mendelsohn
Court did not, however, explicitly state that Aramburu violates the prohibition
on per se rules.160 Although the Mendelsohn Court clearly articulated the
proposition that Aramburu cannot be applied as a per se rule in “me too”
admissibility decisions, it did not prohibit courts from considering whether the
“me too” witness and the plaintiff shared the same supervisor as a factor in the
admissibility analysis.161
Additionally, the Mendelsohn Court offered no instruction on the
appropriate definition of “similarly situated,” despite the fact that the parties
used different definitions throughout the preceding litigation.162 In short, the
Court did not clarify whether having the same supervisor is a legitimate factor
155. See cases cited supra note 29.
156. See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008).
157. See Rubinstein, supra note 26, at 272-73; see also supra text accompanying note 148.
158. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 385.
159. Id. at 387.
160. See id.
161. See Angelina LaPenotiere & Marcus D. Brown, Admissibility of “Me Too” Evidence
in the Post-Mendelsohn Era, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Jan. 2009, at 57, 62.
162. Sprint urged a narrow definition of “similarly situated” requiring common supervisors.
Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 382. The district court required that the “me too” witness be
terminated by the same supervisor and imposed the additional requirement that the terminations
occur in close temporal proximity. Id. Aramburu held that “similarly situated” employees
“deal with the same supervisor and are subject to the same standards governing performance
evaluation and discipline.” Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997),
cited in Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 383; see also supra text accompanying note 69.
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in determining the relevance of “me too” evidence in cases of alleged
company-wide discrimination. Yet notwithstanding the Court’s silence on this
issue, it appears internally inconsistent for the definition of “similarly situated”
to contain a “same supervisor” requirement if Aramburu does not apply to the
particular employment discrimination context at issue—namely, an allegedly
discriminatory RIF or other company-wide policy or practice.163 Despite this
internal inconsistency, however, the district court on remand applied its
original minute order definition of “similarly situated,” which included the
“same supervisor” requirement.164 This time, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.165
C. Mendelsohn’s Impact on Future “Me Too” Evidentiary Disputes
Although the Supreme Court overruled the Tenth Circuit’s original
Mendelsohn decision, its holding is more consistent with Tenth Circuit
precedent than with the established authority of many of the other circuits.
The Tenth and Eighth Circuits do not treat “me too” evidence as per se
admissible—they perform the proper analysis under Rules 401 and 403 and
“freely admit” this evidence upon finding it both relevant and sufficiently
probative.166 By contrast, other circuits approach “me too” evidence with a
predisposition for excluding such evidence.167 Mendelsohn’s conclusion that
“Rules 401 and 403 . . . are generally not amenable to broad per se rules”168
suggests that many of the circuits need to reevaluate their view that “me too”
evidence is generally irrelevant. The circuits need to analyze the various
relevance requirements they have imposed on their admissibility frameworks
and consider abandoning their gloss on Rule 401, if the additional
requirements they have imposed qualify as per se rules to automatically
exclude “me too” testimony under Mendelsohn.
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that cases that proceed
to trial average more than twenty-three months to reach completion, whereas
those that do not are typically disposed of within fifteen months or less.169
163. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
164. See Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 587 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1207-09 (D. Kan.
2008).
165. See No. 08-3334, 2010 WL 4540310 (10th Cir. Nov. 12, 2010).
166. Contra Newman & Crase, supra note 42, at 16-17 (concluding that the Tenth Circuit
found “me too” evidence per se admissible in Mendelsohn); see also discussion supra Part III.A,
B.2.
167. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
168. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387 (2008).
169. See STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 172-74 tbl. C-5 (2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness2009.aspx (follow “Table
C-5" hyperlink).
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These statistics support the argument that courts should definitively resolve
“me too” evidentiary disputes during the pretrial phase when possible to
conserve resources. Nonetheless, some of the courts that have had the
opportunity to apply Mendelsohn and interpret its holding have chosen to
reserve “me too” evidentiary admissibility determinations for trial to allow the
court to consider the evidence within its full factual context.170
Miller v. Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc., a recent employment
discrimination case filed under the ADEA in the Western District of
Oklahoma, illustrates the net effect of Mendelsohn.171 The case did not involve
a RIF; nevertheless, much like the plaintiff in Mendelsohn, the plaintiff alleged
that his employer terminated older workers as part of a company-wide
discriminatory practice.172 In its first motion in limine, the defendant sought
to exclude classic “me too” evidence as both irrelevant under FRE Rule 401
and unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.173 The defendant argued that
testimony by certain former employees should be excluded because the
plaintiff was not “similarly situated” to these witnesses in terms of context,
geography, and time.174
In its order on that motion, the court concluded from the Supreme Court’s
holding in Mendelsohn that “there are no per se rules regarding the
admissibility in individual ADEA cases of testimony by other employees who
claim to be victims of age discrimination by the employer.”175 Nonetheless,
the Miller court did not express concern over the defendant’s incorporation of
Aramburu in its “similarly situated” definition,176 which suggests that the court
170. See, e.g., Ross v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., No. 06-0275-WS-B, 2008 WL
2020470, at *2 (S.D. Ala. May 9, 2008). In Ross, the defendants filed motions in limine to
exclude testimony by employees other than the plaintiff recounting alleged retaliatory actions
taken against them. Id. The court granted various sections of the defendants’ motions but
denied other portions because the “cursory nature of [the m]otions preclude[d] the Court from
conducting the requisite fact-specific, context-specific inquiry to weigh the admissibility of
alleged acts of retaliation.” Id.; see also Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103-05
(8th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging the concern that courts can rarely, if ever, accurately assess the
probative value of “me too” evidence during the pretrial phase, but should reserve their
admissibility determinations until trial), abrogated on other grounds by Foster v. Univ. of Ark.,
938 F.2d 111, 115 (8th Cir. 1991).
171. See Miller v. Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc., No. CIV-06-1008-D, 2008
WL 2079961 (W.D. Okla. May 9, 2008).
172. Id. at *1.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id.; Defendant’s First Motion In Limine and Brief in Support at 4, Miller v. Love’s
Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 2218819 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 17, 2008) (No. CIV06-1008-D).
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did not interpret Mendelsohn as precluding plaintiffs from relying on
Aramburu when alleging company-wide discrimination. Ultimately, the court
denied the defendant’s motion in limine on the basis that the court lacked
sufficient information about the proposed testimonial evidence to make a
reasoned decision regarding its admissibility.177 The court refused to make a
pretrial evidentiary ruling and decided instead to conduct an inquiry at trial,
outside the jury’s presence, each time the plaintiff called a former employee
to testify about his alleged discriminatory termination by the defendant.178
The Miller court’s caution in addressing this motion represents a predictable
response in light of the Supreme Court’s recent Mendelsohn decision. The
judge distinguished Miller, which involved no RIF, from Mendelsohn and
declined to conduct 403 balancing in a vacuum—that is, without reference to
other evidence that would be available at trial.179 Unfortunately, this decision
represents an inefficient and expensive approach to adjudication of
employment discrimination cases. If courts consistently follow the same
approach taken by the Miller court when making pretrial admissibility
decisions, offers of “me too” evidence will lengthen employment
discrimination trials because the courts will essentially be conducting
numerous trials within trials.180
VI. Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of “me too”
evidence in Mendelsohn, it failed to articulate clear standards to help lower
courts determine when this type of evidence should be admissible in
employment discrimination cases. The Mendelsohn Court recognized that
blanket evidentiary exclusions can be just as damaging as blanket evidentiary
admissions. Nonetheless, prolonged evidentiary admissibility decisions,
whether they occur before or during trial, can also adversely impact both
parties.181 Defined rules that guide the courts in making these decisions would
benefit both plaintiffs and defendants because courts must simultaneously
balance the goals of seeking fairness, truth, and justice with the need to reduce
177. Miller, 2008 WL 2079961, at *2.
178. Id.
179. Id. (“[T]he parties have provided insufficient information about the proposed evidence
and the alleged circumstances to enable the Court to make a reasoned decision.”).
180. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 16-17 (citing Moorhouse v.
Boeing Co., 501 F. Supp. 390, 393 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d, 639 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980)).
181. A recent article published by the American Law Institute offers litigators tips for
applying the Court’s holding in Mendelsohn that might help reduce unnecessary delays created
by “me too” evidentiary admissibility disputes. See LaPenotiere & Brown, supra note 161
(identifying seven lessons to guide parties dealing with “me too” evidence).
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unnecessary expense and delay.182 Without defined guidelines in different
types of employment discrimination lawsuits, trial courts will struggle to
achieve the goals set forth by the FRE. Until the Supreme Court sets out more
specific standards, however, courts assessing the admissibility of “me too”
evidence post-Mendelsohn must carefully avoid allowing “crabbed notions of
relevance or excessive mistrust of juries” to guide their decisions.183
Emily D. Wilson

182. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
183. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 1987).

